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LESSONS FROM THE UNITED STATES TRADE
POLICIES TO CONVERT A "PIRATE": THE CASE OF
PHARMACEUTICAL PATENTS IN ARGENTINA.
HERNAN L. BENTOLILA
This analysis describes the radical transformations in pharmaceutical
intellectual property protection in Argentina during the 1990s. Most
importantly, it highlights the consequences of the use by the United States of
unilateral trade weapons to pressure Argentina to adopt certain standards in
this field. The enforcement or threatened enforcement of Section 301 of the US
Trade Act, along with GSP restrictions, have proven to be controversial tools in
protecting US interests abroad, as is demonstrated by the Argentine case. Some
positive results were achieved for United States' interests but the United States
created at the same time negative implications by pressuring for more protection
in a shorter time than is mandated under TRIPs: in other words, requiring
"TRIPs-Plus" standards. The conclusions of this paper could prove useful
when analyzing similar cases over remaining TRIPs "transitional period"
years in developing and least developed countries regarding the protection of
pharmaceutical intellectual property rights.
I. INTRODUCTION
Countries, much like individuals, often seek to protect their
interests when they feel their rights have been threatened or violated.
One of these interests is the right to intellectual property. In the past
fifteen years, countries all over the world have become increasingly
engaged in the protection of their nationals' intellectual property rights
from infringement by forces outside of their country. These battles are
fought on a global level, where issues of patents and trade often
intersect, and decisions made in one country can greatly influence
policies in another.
Overseas "piracy"1 in the pharmaceutical industry has for some
time been considered by the United States to be a serious threat to the
ability of its companies to compete in foreign markets. Since the
strength of intellectual property protection in foreign countries often
1 Christopher Scott Harrison, Protection of Pharmaceuticals as Foreign
Policy: The Canada-U.S. Trade Agreement and Bill C-22 Versus the North American Free
Trade Agreement and Bill C-91, 26 N.C J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 457, 495 (2001)
(noting that "the pharmaceutical industry was able to frame the issue of intellectual
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has a direct influence on the amount and type of technology
transferred by the United States to those countries, the weakness of
protection in Argentina 2 has made the transfer of technology to that
country a controversial issue.
In the pharmaceutical field, the process of discovering a new
drug is long and resource intensive3 ; however, once an effective drug is
on the market, it is comparatively easy to replicate. Since inventors are
forced to share how they made the product in order to receive patent
rights, the opportunities for piracy are endless. If the host country
provides no patent protection on pharmaceuticals, as was the case with
Argentina, drug companies' interests are deeply affected.'
Due to its interests in this field, Pharmaceutical Research and
Manufacturers of America (PhRMA) was able to convince the United
States government of "the need to link trade and [intellectual property
rights] in order to increase the returns on [research and development]
and to prevent imitation."5 The issue took on a political dimension,
with the U.S. Senate being involved at one point. As a result, the
United States was the country that most aggressively acted to raise
standards of pharmaceutical intellectual property protection in
Argentina and the rest of Latin America.
2 See Margalit Edelman, The Argentine Trade Tango: Out of Step on
Intellectual Property Protection, AdTI Issue Brief No. 172 (July 1999), at
http://www.adti.net/html files/ip/Argentine Trade Tango.html (last visited Feb.
20, 2003) (on file with the Yale J.L. & Tech.) ("As Latin America's leading patent
pirate, Argentina costs the United States pharmaceutical industry $600 million
annually ... [Argentina] is responsible for an astonishing 10% of global
pharmaceutical losses.").
3 See Press Release, PhRMA, Statement by PhRMA President and
CEO Alan F. Holmer on the Importance of Intellectual Property for Patients
Worldwide (Nov. 20, 2002), available at
http://www.phrma.org/mediaroom/press/releases/20.11.2002.628.cfm (last visited
Feb. 20, 2003) (on file with the Yale J.L. & Tech.) (noting that expenditures by
research-based pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies were more than $30
billion in 2001).
4 Submission of PhRMAfor the "Special 301 " Report on Intellectual Property
Barriers, PhRMA (Sept. 15, 2001), at
http://www.phrma.org/international/special301/argentina.cfm (last visited Feb. 20,
2003) (on file with the Yale J.L. & Tech.) (estimating the total losses in Argentina to
be more than $750 million a year, conservatively). PhRMA estimated in 1999 that
"[i] f current trade barriers were removed, PhRMA member company affiliates in
Argentina would enjoy a potential increase in sales of over US $500 million dollars
[sic]." Priority Foreign Countries, PhRMA (1999), at
http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/phrma/301-99/argentina.html (last visited Feb.
20, 2003) (on file with the Yale J.L. & Tech.).
5 CARLOS M. CORREA, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, THE WTO
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Argentina's adoption of the World Trade Organization's
(WTO) Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights (TRIPs Agreement) represented a crucial change in its
protection of intellectual property, with profound implications in the
field of pharmaceutical products. At the inception of the Uruguay
Round of trade negotiations, about 50 countries did not confer
protection for pharmaceutical products. The TRIPs Agreement obliged
all WTO Member countries to recognize such protection.6 During the
last half of the 1990's Argentina modified its laws in order to meet its
international commitments, to avoid trade sanctions, and in the hopes
of bringing in additional foreign investment.
Sections II, III, IV and V of this Article explore the process of
legal reforms that took place in the Argentine Republic in the field of
pharmaceutical patents. Section VI then describes the trade policy
tools utilized by the United States in order to "pressure" Argentina to
comply with U.S. standards. These standards were in many cases
higher than the TRIPs Agreement standards. Section VII describes, in
a time line format, the effects of the trade policy tools utilized during
enactment of the protection laws. Section VIII explores the
inconsistencies of using unilateral measures after TRIPs to protect IP
rights overseas. Section IX provides some thoughts on the dangers that
the United States' "overseas IP defense policy" can create when trying
to impose standards higher than those established in international
agreements by means of unilateral mechanisms. Section X proposes
alternative mechanisms that could be employed in similar cases arising
in developing countries during transitional periods under TRIPs.
Finally, in Section XI the paper reaches a conclusion regarding the
final outcome of a process that played itself out over a decade.
6 Carlos M. Correa, Recent Developments in the Field ofPharmaceutical
Patents: Implementation of the TRIPs Agreement, Universidad de Buenos Aires, at
http://www.haiweb.org/campaign/novseminar/correa2.html (last visited Feb. 20,
2003) (on file with the Yale J.L. & Tech.).
H. BENTOLILA
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II. ARGENTINA UNDER LAW NO. 111:
No PATENTS FOR PHARMACEUTICAL PRODUCTS
Argentine Law No. 111, which was enacted in 1864' and set
the legal standard for Argentina in this field for over 130 years, did not
allow for patents of pharmaceutical products. It did, however,
recognize patents for the pharmaceutical process. However, it is often
difficult to determine the way in which a possible transgressor has
manufactured the product, as the final chemical structure of the
product will be the same, independent of the process used. For this
reason, it was virtually impossible to claim property rights under this
system.8
For over 100 years there was controversy over Article 4 of Law
No. 111 and its lack of protection for pharmaceutical products. The
main objection was of a constitutional nature: the Argentine
Constitution in Article 17 states "every author or inventor is the
exclusive owner of his work, invention or discovery, during the term
provided by law." The Argentine Supreme Court, however, rejected
the claim of unconstitutionality under Article 4 considering that
"constitutional rights are subject to regulation, and that it is not
possible to consider invalid a legal provision that, on security, moral or
public health grounds, denies the protection granted in general by
Article 17 to inventions that, for one reason or other, are considered
harmful to the high objectives of the State."9
Starting in 1960, several legislative bills sought to permit
patents for pharmaceutical products but never became law. 10
7 FUNDACIbN DE INVESTIGACIONES ECONOMICAS
LATINOAMERICANAS (FIEL), PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS,
THE CASE OF THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY IN ARGENTINA 65-66 (1990) ("An
analysis of this regulation shows, as in the case of other countries' legislation, a
noticeable influence of the French law of 1844. Particularly regarding the subject
under consideration, the fact stands out that this law provided that pharmaceutical
compounds or medicines of any kind were not patentable. ... It should be noted in
this respect, that a major reform was effected in France in 1959. Since then the
issuance of patents for pharmaceutical products has been authorized. Argentina,
however, did not carry out this revision.").
8 Id. at 70 ("It should be noted, however, that in practice this
protection proves ineffective due to the fact that in Argentine legislation the burden
of proving the assumed infringement is borne by the patent owner. This proof cannot
be produced on the basis of the substance itself. It must be obtained at the place of
production, something virtually impossible if the substance as it is generally the
case in Argentina has been imported from another country.").
9 "American Cyanamid Co. c. Unifa, S.A.," CSJN 164 Fallos 284
(1970) (translation by author)
10 FIEL, supra note 7, at 70 n.20 (noting that some of the bills
presented include drafts by Breuer Moreno, 1960; Senator Barbich, 1965;
2002-2003
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III. THE TRIPs AGREEMENT
On December 15, 1993, President Clinton submitted to the
United States Congress a series of documents concerning the Uruguay
Round Agreements.11 Those negotiations led to the TRIPs text covered
by the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU),2 which promised to
ensure intellectual property rights among the Member Countries and
included the possibility of trade sanctions13 if a Member violates its
obligations. 4
One major omission of the TRIPs provisions was the lack of
"pipeline" or retroactive protection for inventions that were not
protected under the old laws. 15  The U.S government and
pharmaceutical industry have attempted to obtain retroactive
recognition for patented pharmaceuticals. Because the "pirate"
pharmaceutical industry in Argentina is worth $4.6 billion and
supplies the rest of Latin America with pirated copies of U.S.-patented
pharmaceuticals,16 the lack of pipeline protection remains a troubling
issue for U.S. investors in pharmaceutical industries. Brazil, in
response to similar concerns, enacted a patent law in June of 1996 that
Congressman Tecera del Franco, 1965; Congressmen Gonzalez, Ghiano and
Riquez, 1984; Senator G. Feris, 1986; and Congressman E. Varela-Cid, 1989).
11 58 Fed. Reg. 67263 (Dec. 15, 1993).
12 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, pt V, art. 64, par. 1, 33 I.L.M. 81, 106 (1994) [hereinafter
TRIPs], ("The provisions of Articles XXII and XXIII of GATT 1994 as elaborated
and applied by the Dispute Settlement Understanding shall apply to consultations
and the settlement of disputes under this Agreement except as otherwise specifically
provided herein.")
13 In this sense, President Clinton's message to Congress for the
approval of the Uruguay Round Agreements pointed out that a measure adopted
through Special 301 would be legitimized "[A]t the end of the dispute settlement
process..." as contemplated in the DSU. 58 Fed. Reg. 67263, 67292 (Dec. 15, 1993).
14 FOLsoM, GORDON & SPANOGLE, JR., INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS
TRANSACTIONS 853 (4th ed. 1999).
15 See PABLO CHALLU & MIRTA LEVIS, ADECUACION DE LA LEY
ARGENTINA DE PATENTES AL GATT 41 (1996) ("Section 8 (of TRIPs Article 70)
mandates that during the transition period and from the date of entry into force of
the WTO Agreement (January 1, 1995) patent applications for those sectors
(pharmaceutical and agricultural chemical products) must be received, under
certain conditions from which it is clear that retroactivity or pipeline is absent.")
(translation by author).
16 Edgardo Buscaglia & Clarisa Long, U.S. Foreign Policy and Intellectual
Property Rights in Latin America, Hoover Institution, Stanford University, at
http://www.hoover.stanford.edu/publications/epp/epp77.html (last visited Feb. 20,
2003) (on file with the Yale J.L. & Tech.).
H. BENTOLILA
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grants pipeline protection for pharmaceuticals.17 Mexico did so in
1991.
Under the TRIPs Agreement, not all countries were required to
reach the same levels of intellectual property protection at the same
time. The most developed countries would be held to the TRIPs
standards as early as January 1, 1996. The group of countries known
as the "developing countries," among which Argentina was included,
had an additional period, which ended on January 1, 2000, to create or
modify their internal legislation in order to meet the standard
protection for intellectual property rights. Finally, the "least developed
country Members" had a 10 year transition period beginning Jan. 1,
1995, the date the TRIPS Agreement came into force, with the
possibility of further extensions.1" This form of "country classification"
seemed to arise from the United Nations economic development
guidelines.19
Before the TRIPs Agreement there was no protection (or
obligation to implement protective legislation) for pharmaceutical
patent rights under Argentine law. Under Article 65.4 of TRIPs,
Argentina had the possibility of "delaying" implementation of
pharmaceutical patents until Jan. 1, 2005, not because it was classified
as a "developing country", but because there was no protection (or
obligation to implement protective legislation) for this field under local
law. 20 The inclusion of such "phase-in" periods was a direct result of
extensive negotiations between Member countries. Through the
negotiations, developing countries were allowed the necessary time
involved in adopting the required legislation to implement these drastic
changes. The Members wanted to make sure that enough flexibility
was given, so that the adaptation process could come about gradually.
That would ensure real and uniform protection of intellectual property
17 See Christopher S. Mayer, The Brazilian Pharmaceutical Industry Goes
Walking from Ipanema to Prosperity: Will the New Intellectual Property Law Spur Domestic
Investment?, 12 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 377, 387 (1998) ("In fact, the [Brazilian]
Industrial Property Law exceeds the minimum requirements of TRIPS by providing
for 'pipeline protection,' ... The pipeline protection allows foreign pharmaceutical
companies to obtain patent protection in Brazil for the remainder of the term of their
patents in their home country.").
18 TRIPs, supra note 12, pt. VI, art. 66, 33 I.L.M. at 107.
19 "Pirelli S.p.A. c. Instituto Nacional de la Propiedad Industrial,"
CNFed. Civ. y Com. [1999-A] L.L. 27 (Amadeo, J.).
20 TRIPs, supra note 12, pt. VI, art. 65, par. 4, 33 I.L.M at 107 ("To the
extent that a developing country Member is obliged by this Agreement to extend
product patent protection to areas of technology not so protectable in its territory on
the general date of application of this Agreement for that Member, as defined in
paragraph 2, it may delay the application of the provisions on product patents of
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rights in the long run, whereas a drastic change might lead only to
partial fulfillment of the protection standards.21 These transitional
periods, in the case of pharmaceuticals, were never accepted by the
United States.22 In fact, the United States Trade Representative
(USTR) stated explicitly that "ensuring that developing countries come
into full compliance with the [TRIPs] Agreement before the end of the
transition periods is one of this Administration's highest priorities."23
This is not a minor point. As shall be examined, many developing
countries (including Argentina) came under extreme pressure to
accelerate the pace of their reforms in order to fulfill the TRIPs
standards before the deadlines established under the agreement.24
IV. LAW No. 24.48 1: ARGENTINE PATENT LAW
Argentine Law No. 24.481 internalized the TRIPs Agreement
and its standards of patent protection. However, Argentina had
already adhered to the WTO Uruguay Round Agreements containing
TRIPs.25
The law underwent some modifications by Argentine Law No.
24.572.2' This was a direct result of pressure exerted by the United
States, which maintained that the original text of Law No. 24.481 did
not offer high enough standards of protection. As a result, President
21 Hearing to Review U.S. Trade Policy Objectives and Initiatives Before the
Subcomm. on Trade of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 105th Cong. (1997)
(statement of Alan F. Holmer, President of the PhRMA) ("Regrettably, the
intellectual property section of the WTO Uruguay Round Agreement, the Trade
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property, or TRIPs, falls short of the NAFTA
standard. Although the two agreements contain similar substantive provisions,
TRIPs, at the insistence of a number of developing countries, allows such countries
to delay pharmaceutical patent protection until 2005."), available at
http://waysandmeans.house.gov/legacy.aspfile=legacy/trade/105cong/3-18-97/3-
18holm.htm (last visited Mar. 14, 2003).
22 See Menem Afirm6 que Vetaria Una Nueva Ley de Patentes, LA NAcION
LINE, June 17, 1999 ("[U.S. ambassador to Argentina James] Cheek said that the
[Argentine patent] law was for a country such as 'Burundi,' and that Argentina
should not have established any transition period. ")(translation by author).
23 Press Release, Office of the USTR, USTR Announces Results of
Special 301 Annual Review (Apr. 30, 1999) (on file with the Yale J.L. & Tech.).
24 CARLOS M. CORREA, DERECHO DE PATENTES 395-396 (1996)
("[T]he position of the United States' Government, which required not only
immediate patents for pharmaceuticals but also retroactivity through the pipeline
formula.") (translation by author).
25 Law No. 24.425, Boletin Oficial [B.O.] Jan. 5, 1995.
26 CORREA, supra note 24, at 399 ("Law 24.481 . . . established an 8
year time frame for the recognition of pharmaceutical product patents. As a result of
the enactment of Law 24.572, it was shortened to 5 years as is stated in article 100 of
the law.") (translation by author).
H. BENTOLILA
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Carlos Menem 27 vetoed 16 articles of Law No. 24.481, in exchange for
which the United States did not impose trade sanctions on Argentina
in 1995. The final modifications were introduced into the text of Law
No. 24.481 by Presidential Decree No. 260/96.28 In this way, Law No.
24.481 is still recognized as the "Argentine Patent & Models of
Utility" law with the Law No. 24.572 modifications as established by
Presidential Decree No. 260/96. However, all of these laws, as well as
others that were enacted during this time, contributed to much
confusion in the field for several months.29
Article 100 is the most important section of the law with respect
to pharmaceuticals. This article establishes: "The inventions of
pharmaceutical products shall not be patentable before FIVE (5) years
from the publication of the present law in the Boletin Oficial. Until that
date none of the articles contained in the present law which mandate
the patentability of pharmaceutical product inventions shall be under
force, including those other precepts that are inseparably related to the
patentability of such product."30 However, the following article goes
on to say that "[a]pplications for pharmaceutical product patents may
be submitted in the form and terms established under the present law,
and shall begin to be granted five years from the publication of the law
in the Boletin Oficial."'31 The duration of such patents, once they
became available on October 24, 2000,32 should be the length stated in
Article 35 of Law No. 24.481: twenty years, non-renewable, counted
from the date the application is filed.33
The TRIPs Agreement does not define exclusive marketing
rights (EMRs), although it does mention the conditions under which
they shall be granted.3 4 The Agreement does not shed any light as to
27 Carlos S. Menem was President of Argentina from 1989 1999.
28 Decree No. 260/96, B.O. Mar. 22, 1996.
29 An example of this can be found in Law No. 24.603, B.O. Jan. 5,
1996, which partially cleared up the situation by establishing the Official Patent Law
of the Argentine Republic, Law No. 24.481, B.O. Mar. 22, 1996, with its
modifications. On the other hand, Law 24.603 also generated some debate between
the Executive and Legislative branches as to the Executive's role in the
implementation of the law (this is reflected by Presidential Decree No. 3/96
published on the same day).
30 Law No. 24.481, art. 100, B.O. Sept. 20, 1995.
31 Law No. 24.481, art. 101, B.O. Sept. 20, 1995.
32 This is the date that results from adding 5 years to the date of
publication of Law No. 24.572 as stated in Law No. 24.481, art. 101.
33 This coincides with the established term under TRIPs. TRIPs, supra
note 12, pt. II, sec. V, art. 33, 33 I.L.M. at 96. ("Term of Protection: The term of
protection available shall not end before the expiration of a period of twenty years
counted from the filing date.")
34 TRIPs, supra note 12, pt. VII, art. 70, par. 9, 33 I.L.M at 110.
("Where a product is the subject of a patent application in a Member in accordance
with paragraph 8(i) above, exclusive marketing rights shall be granted,
2002-2003
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the content or scope of these rights,35 and there seems to be no
documentation tracing their origin. However, it would seem logical to
infer that the holder of an EMR could not be in the same position as a
patent holder. If that were the case, the "transition periods" established
by the TRIPs Agreement would have no practical effect.36 The TRIPs
Agreement obligated countries such as Argentina to provide a system
whereby patent applications for pharmaceutical products can be
"deposited" (often referred to as a "mailbox" system). In the event that
the subject of such a "mailbox" application obtains marketing
approval before a decision is reached on its patent, an EMR of up to
five years will have to be granted - provided that the established
conditions set forth in Article 70.9 are met.37
These EMRs were greatly opposed by the local lobbies in
Argentina because:
1. The "transition period" for granting pharmaceutical patents
would not be applicable in these cases.
2. The rights would be even greater than those granted by a
patent because they would not be limited for reasons of abusive
practices, exploitation, or national security.
3. A person could obtain exclusivity for a product that would
not be patentable under the Argentine Patent Law.
4. They would permit the temporary exclusivity of products
that were already in the public domain.
notwithstanding the provisions of Part VI above, for a period of five years after
obtaining marketing approval in that Member or until a product patent is granted or
rejected in that Member, whichever period is shorter, provided that, subsequent to
the entry into force of the WTO Agreement , a patent application has been filed and
a patent granted for that product in another Member and marketing approval
obtained in such other Member.").
35 CHALLU & LEVIS, supra note 15, at 42 ("[T]his concept [of EMR's],
which is ambiguous and lacks precise definition even by the WTO.") (translation by
author).
36 CARLOS CORREA, ACUERDO TRIPs 234 (1996) ("[T]he exclusive
marketing rights grant an ius exclusivum but not an ius prohibendi. This last one
characterizes a patent. This means that the holder of such rights could commercialize
his product and eventually require a payment from third parties that are also
commercialising it but could not exclude them from such commercialisation.")
(translation by author). However, groups such as CILFA (Argentine pharmaceutical
trade association) were opposed to these rights because, in their view, these rights are
the equivalent of granting a patent since they recognize the same rights a patent
would.
37 TRIPs, supra note 12, pt. VII, art. 70, par. 9, 33 I.L.M at 110.
H. BENTOLILA
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5. They would refer to products that were already
commercialized in the Argentine market.
The EMRs resulted in major conflicts with the United States,
but they also caused serious contentions within Argentina. The
Argentine patent law does not deal with "exclusive marketing
rights," although the implementation decree of Article 101 does.38
This was the cause of great debate.39 The Argentine Executive
introduced these rights through the law's implementation decree and
substantially modified the law that the Congress had drafted.40 The
article states that the application for exclusive marketing rights
during the "transition period" (from Oct. 23, 1995, to Oct. 23, 2000),
shall be presented before the National Institute of Industrial Property
41(INPI).
As can be concluded from the above explanation, the text of the
Argentine patent law (along with its corresponding implementation
decree) is in harmony with the TRIPs standards regarding these rights.
However, it should be noted that while the "transition period" for the
Argentine Republic was in effect, only two such "exclusive marketing
rights" were actually granted. One was for "Zyprexa"
(Olanzapine/Olanzapina) during September 1998, and the other was
for "Xenical" (Orlistat).42 The problem with the few EMR's that were
granted was that "the Argentine agency ANMAT, a functional
equivalent of the U.S. Food and Drug Administration, refused to
enforce the EMR by suspending regulatory approvals for . . . copied
products."43 The agency alleged that it did not count with the
necessary specific rules in order to enforce the EMRs.. This provoked
the response of the United States, which also expressed that "during
the remainder of 1999, INPI failed to act on a number of well-
38 Decree No. 260/96, B.O. Mar, 22, 1996.
39 See CORREA, supra note 24, at 402 ("[D]ecree 260/96 . . . has
exceeded its implementation power because the law does not create any type of
exclusive marketing rights. Such a creation ... cannot result from an administrative
rule such as a decree.") (translation by author). See generally BIDART CAMPOS,
TRATADO ELEMENTAL DE DERECHO CONSTITUCIONAL ARGENTINO 307 (1995)
("The (Argentine) Supreme Court of Justice has said that the implementation decrees
are obligatory for the inhabitants as if their dispositions were stated in the law, as
long as they are within the limitations of Article 99, Clause 2, of the Constitution;
they are considered as an integral part of the law.") (translation by author).
40 Decree No. 260/96, B.O. Mar, 22, 1996.
41 Id.
42 Interview with Engineer Luis Noguds, Commissioner of the
Argentine National Patent Administration (part of the INPI), in Buenos Aires,
Argentina (June 25, 2001).
43 Riker, Danzig, Scherer, Hyland & Perretti LLP, 4/00 Patent
Protection in Argentina, at http://www.riker.com/feature/3361.html (last visited Jan.
1, 2002) (on file with the Yale J.L. & Tech.).
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documented EMR applications by U.S. firms, and denied one
application on seemingly unsustainable grounds."44
V. UNDISCLOSED INFORMATION UNDER
TRIPs & ARGENTINE LAW
Section 7 of the TRIPs Agreement refers to "Undisclosed
Information."45 Through it, member countries agreed to protect certain
test data from disclosure. In other words, the parties thereto agreed to
enact legislation guaranteeing minimum protection to undisclosed
information. In the case of pharmaceuticals, this is of vital importance.
The development of a drug is a very lengthy process that requires
extensive data to be gathered during the pre-clinical and clinical trials.
Such trials are the only way to ensure that a certain drug is safe and
has the quality and efficacy necessary to be prescribed to patients. It is
not uncommon for several years to pass from the discovery of a drug
to the moment that it is actually marketed. The average cost for this
process is over $500 million.46
The protection of data provides incentives for the development
of innovative pharmaceutical products. While data exclusivity and
patents are the two most critical and, hence, relevant intellectual
property rights for the pharmaceutical industry, they are distinct forms
of protection; protection of one right is neither dependent on nor
linked to the other. Countries with the leading research-based
pharmaceutical industries recognize the strong incentive provided by
data exclusivity. They have taken steps to ensure that the proprietary
registration data submitted in order to gain marketing approval are
protected against unfair commercial use and disclosure.47 Under the
TRIPs Agreement, Argentina was required to protect this type of data.
44 Office of the USTR., 2000 National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign
Trade Barriers, available at http://www.ustr.gov/reports/nte/2000/nte2OOO.pdf (last
visited Jan. 1, 2002) (on file with the Yale J.L. & Tech.).
45 TRIPs, supra note 12, pt. II, sec. 7, 33 I.L.M at 98.
46 PhRMA has stated that "the average pre-tax cost of developing a
drug introduced in 2001 is over $500 million, including the cost of research failures
as well as interest costs over the entire investment period." PhRMA, Intellectual
Property: Overview, at
http://www.phrma.org/publications/publications/profile01/intro.phtml (last
visited Jan 1, 2002) (on file with the Yale J.L. & Tech.).
47 In this sense, "[I]n order for patent protection and data protection to
be meaningful, PhRMA believes that U.S. trade partners need to establish a linkage
between the national patent authority and the central health regulatory authority. In
other words, there needs to be communication between the Patent Office and the
Health Ministry to ensure that the health regulatory authority does not provide
marketing authorization for unauthorized copies of products subject to patent
H. BENTOLILA
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On December 20, 1996, Argentine Law No. 24.7664 was
enacted. Its short text discusses the process through which
pharmaceutical products are approved for commercialization. The
information needed for such authorization is related to the
composition and the production process of a medication that is about
to be commercialized. This authorization stage comes after a patent
has been issued and may require that certain information pertaining to
the efficacy of the product be made available to the local health
authority. The law protects this information from "[a]ny dishonest
commercial use" and states that it "shall not be disclosed., 49 However,
under Article 5, "similar products" can be approved by the "local
sanitary authority" once the original product has been registered in
Argentina, the United States, or any other country mentioned in
Annex I. In this case an "abbreviated procedure" is implemented.
According to Article 5, if someone has a "similar product" to one that
has already been registered, that person can rely on and use the same
"tests" that had to be performed to obtain commercial authorization
for the existing product.50 In other words, a party that has performed
extensive tests and research trusts confidential information to the
corresponding health authority in order to authorize its product; that
information, however, can also be used by others seeking
authorization for similar or identical products. The article ends by
stating that "[t]he approval of the registration or of the authorization
for commercialization by the local administrative authority under the
procedures established in this article for similar products does not
imply the use of the confidential information protected under this
law.)
51
This led to one of the United States' main complaints regarding
inadequacies in the Argentine protection of intellectual property rights
in the pharmaceutical field. The big pharmaceutical manufacturers
also opposed the "abbreviated procedure" allowed by Article 5.52 The
protection. Governments, not patent offices, are bound by the WTO TRIPS
Agreement, and it is the responsibility of all relevant government agencies to ensure
that TRIPS obligations on patent protection and data exclusivity are met." PhRMA,
at http://www.phrma.org/policy/aroundworld/special301/append-a.phtml (last
visited Jan. 1 2002).
48 "Law on the Confidentiality of Information and Products that are
legitimately under the control of a person and that are improperly disclosed in a way
inconsistent with Trade Practices."
49 Law No. 24.766, art. 4, B.O. Dec. 30, 1996.
50 Law No. 24.766, art. 5, B.O. Dec. 30, 1996.
51 Id.
52 See Hearing to Review U.S. Trade Policy Objectives and Initiatives Before
the Subcomm. on Trade of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 105th Cong. (1997)
(statement of Alan F. Holmer, President of the PhRMA) ("On December 18, 1996,
the Argentine Congress approved legislation on trade secrets that also falls far short
of international standards and TRIPs. The law does not provide any protection to the
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main objection to the law was the "similarity" concept contained in
the text, which allows anyone to use an inverse formula to arrive at an
original pharmaceutical product. This was viewed as protecting local
Argentine laboratories because it permitted the registration of drugs
that were similar to, but not necessarily identical to, others that were
already on the market. Drug manufacturers from outside Argentina
argue that very precise proof should be required to verify that when
someone tries to register a medication similar to another he is using a
different production process than that used by the inventor of the drug.
The problem was exemplified during the "transition period," in
which Argentina did not issue patents for pharmaceutical products.
The following example illustrates the United States' concern in this
area. When Pfizer, the first company to introduce Viagra (sildefil),
obtained marketing authorization from the Administraci6n Nacional
de Medicamentos, Alimentos y Tecnologia Medica (ANMAT),53
several local companies quickly followed with requests to authorize
"similar products."54 Since there were no pharmaceutical patents
issued at the time, a company could copy Viagra55 and easily obtain
authorization to commercialize it by relying on the original company's
information and the "similarity" provision in Article 5.56 Local
companies were required, however, to demonstrate to the ANMAT
proprietary data that pharmaceutical companies submit for registration. Article 5
compels the Ministry of Health to approve similar products (i.e., copies) in a
maximum of 120 days based on the submission of minimal information. By not
providing a term of protection (as is the case with similar legislation in other
countries), a competitor does not have to submit its own data during that term and,
thus, can be in the market in less than four months."), available at
http://waysandmeans.house.gov/legacy.aspfile=legacy/trade/105cong/3-18-97/3-
18holm.htm (last visited Mar. 14, 2003).
53 ANMAT is the Argentine equivalent of the Food and Drug
Administration.
54 See generally Virginia Santana, Investigar No Sera Redituable Si No Se
Protegen Las Patentes, LA NAcION LINE, Oct. 30, 1998 (stating that only one local
Argentine pharmaceutical company, Bago, obtained a license from Pfizer to produce
the product, which it marketed under the name "Lumix.").
55 Juan Aznarez, El Viagra Reabre La Puja Por La Ley De Patentes, LA
NAcIbN LINE, July 1, 1998 (quoting Clives Miles, Director of Pfizer Argentina, as
stating "We spend 450 million dollars to develop the product [Viagra] and here they
copy us to make money without investing anything.") (translation by author).
56 Natalia Chientaroli, El Viagra Avivo La Pelea Entre Los Laboratorios
Locales y Extranjeros, LA NAcIbN LINE, July 19, 1998 ("Currently seven local
(Argentine laboratories) have obtained authorization from the National
Administration of Medication, Food and Medical Technology (ANMAT) to produce
medication made with the base drug, sildenafil. Two additional laboratories await
approval. ') (translation by author).
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their capability of producing a medication similar to the one produced
by Pfizer.57
The concern expressed over this law by the United States and
by pharmaceutical companies during the transition period was well
founded. However, once Argentina started to grant patents on new
products in October 2000, the available protection improved. Even
though the information that was submitted to the health authority
could be used by another company to obtain commercial approval for
a "similar drug," the other company could not legally produce the
product without the corresponding license and royalty payment.5"
Local pharmaceutical companies in Argentina, as well as other
groups, viewed the opposition to the law as "backdoor attempts to
convey private monopoly power for drugs that do not qualify for
patent protection.""
Additionally, there are two other concerns over this law. First
of all, the law has been in force since January 1, 1997, but was never
implemented by the Executive. This has made its actual application
difficult because, due to the law's importance, an Executive decree is
necessary for its correct implementation. Secondly, there is no
"linkage" obligation established between the ANMAT and the
Argentine Administraci6n Nacional de Patentes (National Patent
Administration).6 ° This could lead to the marketing authorization of a
medication produced by a company that has not obtained the
corresponding license to manufacture the patented product. In other
words, unauthorized copies of products subject to patent protection
could obtain commercialization approval.
57 Id.
58 It must be remembered, however, that there is no retroactive or
"pipeline" protection under the Argentine Patent Law.
59 USA Urged to Withdraw Action Against Argentina, MARKETLETTER,
Feb. 17, 1997.
60 Interview with Alba Duchowna, legal advisor, ANMAT, in Buenos
Aires, Argentina (July 2, 2001) ("Unfortunately, there is no contact between us and
the Administracion Nacional de Patentes (National Patent Administration)").
2002-2003
16
Yale Journal of Law and Technology, Vol. 5 [2003], Iss. 1, Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjolt/vol5/iss1/2
LESSONS FROM THE UNITED STATES
VI. TRADE "WEAPONS" UTILIZED BY THE UNITED STATES TO
PRESSURE ARGENTINA TO ENACT LEGISLATION
ACCELERATING PATENTS ON PHARMACEUTICALS
A. SPECIAL 301
The "Special 301" provisions of the Trade Act of 1974, as
amended61 , require the USTR to identify foreign countries that deny
adequate and effective protection of intellectual property rights or deny
fair and equitable market access for U.S. companies that rely on
intellectual property protection.62 This provision has been referred to as
a "crowbar" to pry open foreign markets and also as the "H bomb of
trade policy.""63 Special 301 was amended in the Uruguay Round
Agreements to clarify that a country can be found to deny adequate
and effective intellectual property protection even if it is in compliance
the TRIPs Agreement. It was also amended to direct the USTR to take
into account a country's prior status under Special 301, the history of
U.S. efforts to achieve stronger intellectual property protection in the
country, and the country's response to such efforts. Once the pool of
countries has been determined, the USTR is required to decide which,
if any, of these countries should be designated Priority Foreign
Countries. Priority Foreign Countries are those countries that:
1. Have the acts, policies, and practices that are the most
onerous, egregious, and have the greatest adverse impact (actual or
potential) on relevant U.S. products; and,
2. Are not engaged in good faith negotiations or making
significant progress in addressing these problems.
While the TRIPs Agreement is a multilateral agreement
through which protection of intellectual property rights was agreed
upon by many countries, Special 301 allows the threat of "unilateral
retaliation" by the United States in order to persuade countries to raise
their standards of protection in this field.64 Once TRIPs was enacted,
61 See Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No.
100-418, 102 Stat. 1107 (1988) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 19
U.S.C.).
62 19 U.S.C. § 2242 (2003).
63 Judith H. Bello, Section 301: The United States' Response to Latin
American Trade Barriers Involving Intellectual Property , 21 INTER-AM. L. REV. 495, 495
(1989).
64 See Robert Pechman, Seeking Multilateral Protection for Intellectual
Property: the United States "TRJPs" over Special 301, 7 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 179,
197 (1998) ("In the first Special 301 report released by the USTR in May 1989, no
cited countries were identified as PFCs [priority foreign countries] even though the
USTR concluded that none of the countries cited provided adequate protection of
H. BENTOLILA
17
BENTOLILA: LESSONS FROM THE UNITED STATES TRADE POLICIES TO CONVERT A "PIRATE"
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2003
YALE JOURNAL OF LAW & TECHNOLOGY
the United States began to use Special 301 to monitor how Members
were complying with it and also as a tool "to accelerate
implementation of this [TRIPs] Agreement,"" even though certaintransition periods had been established.
For several years, many countries had complained that, in their
view, Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 was not WTO-consistent
and that unilateral action was contrary to the letter and spirit of TRIPs
because it supersedes WTO dispute settlement under the DSU. This
issue had a partial, but not very clear, resolution in January 2000. The
WTO's Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) adopted the report of a
Dispute Settlement Panel upholding the WTO consistency of Section
301 of the Trade Act of 1974. The Panel rejected a complaint by the
European Union (EU) that Section 301 was inconsistent with WTO
rules.66 Although the United States took this as a victory,67 the decision
must be analyzed closely.6 This is because the decision was based in
intellectual property. Twenty-five of those countries were named to watch lists, and
the USTR scrutinized those watch listed countries for progress in improved
recognition of intellectual property rights. In April 1990, the USTR again declined to
designate any watch-listed country as a PFC, under the rationale that adequate
progress had been made. The first PFC's, China, India and Thailand were
designated by the USTR in its third annual report in 1991. This more proactive
approach by the USTR coincided with stalled TRIPs negotiations. Thus, negotiation
challenges in the Uruguay Round shifted US policy toward placing more emphasis
on Special 301.").
65 Press Release, Office of the USTR, USTR Announces Two
Decisions: Title VII and Special 301 (Apr. 30, 1996) (on file with the Yale J.L. &
Tech.).
66 See WTO Upholds Section 301 of Trade Act, Tech Law Journal (Jan.
29, 2000) ("The EU filed its complaint against the United States with the WTO on
November 25, 1998. The WTO established a panel to review the complaint on
March 2, 1999. This panel issued its report on December 22, 1999. The WTO
Dispute Settlement Body adopted this report [in January 2000]. [T]he EC alleges that
Title III, chapter 1 (sections 301-310) of the Trade Act, as amended, and in particular
sections 306 and 305 of the Act, are inconsistent with Articles 3, 21, 22 and 23 of the
DSU; Article XVI: 4 of the WTO Agreement; and Articles I, II, III, VIII and XI of
GATT 1994. The EC also alleges that the Trade Act nullifies and impairs benefits
accruing, directly or indirectly, to it under GATT 1994, and also impedes the
objectives of GATT 1994 and of the WTO."), at
http://www.techlawjournal.com/trade/20000129.htm (last visited Dec. 4, 2002).
67 Id. ("'We are pleased that the WTO has now formally confirmed the
panel's conclusion that Section 301 is consistent with U.S. WTO obligations,' stated
[USTR] Charlene Barshefsky in a press release on January 27. 'Today's action by the
WTO closes the door on the EU's unfounded claims regarding the legitimacy of
Section 301. Section 301 has been and will remain essential to our efforts to enforce
our international trade rights.'").
68 Id. ("The EU released a statement which concluded that 'The Panel
concluded that the relevant part of the legislation as such was inconsistent with the
WTO. It also came to the final conclusion that it could be considered in conformity
with the WTO -- but only because the US undertook before the Panel that in each
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full or in part on US undertakings (that "the administration cannot
make any unilateral determinations")69 made in the past or to the
Panel.7" In this sense, Ranabir Ray Choudhury explains the report's
last paragraph: "significantly, all these conclusions are based in full or
in part on the US Administration's undertakings . . . It thus follows
that should they be repudiated or in any other way removed by the US
Administration or another branch of the US Government, the findings
of conformity (with WTO rules, generally speaking) contained in these
conclusions would no longer be warranted.
71
B. GENERALIZED SYSTEM OF PREFERENCES
The United States Generalized System of Preferences (GSP)
constitutes an additional "trade weapon" through which threats of
unilateral retaliation were used to pressure Argentina to raise its levels
of intellectual property protection on pharmaceuticals. The GSP
program is chaired by the Office of the United States Trade
Representative (USTR) and was instituted on January 1, 1976 to
promote economic development in developing countries through
increased trade. 72 The program extends preferential tariff treatment
(low or zero duties for designated products), which provides a
and every case it would use its discretionary powers under Section 301 to act in
compliance with WTO rules and procedures.').
69 See Chakravarthi Raghaven, WTO Panel Upholds US. Sanction Law,
THIRD WORLD NETWORK, Dec. 23, 1999, ("The ruling, and the reasoning, handed
down in a report published on 22 December, by a 3-member panel in a dispute
between the European Community and the United States, appears to be a "political"
rather than rules-based "legal" judgment, based not upon the letter of the US law that
enables US unilateralism, but on the US administration's undertakings (and
interpretation) that the administration cannot make any unilateral determinations")
at http://www.twnside.org.sg/title/uphold-cn.htm (last visited Mar. 27, 2003).
70 See WTO Secretariat, Excerptfrom the WTO 's Overview of the State-of
play of WTO Disputes. (Jan 13, 2000) ("The Panel found that Sections 304(a)(2)(A),
305(a) and 306(b) of the US Trade Act of 1974 were not inconsistent with Article
23.2(a) or (c) of the DSU or with any of the GATT 1994 provisions cited. The panel
noted that its findings were based in full or in part on US undertakings articulated in
the Statement of Administrative Action approved by the US Congress at the time it
implemented the Uruguay Round agreements and confirmed in the statements by the
US to the panel. The panel stated therefore that should those undertakings be
repudiated or in any other way removed, its findings of conformity would no longer
be warranted. The report of the panel was circulated to Members on 22 December
1999. "), available at http://www.techlawhoumal.com/trade/20000113.htm (last
visited Dec. 1, 2002).
71 Ranabir Ray Choudhury, India: Wielding the "Big Stick" in Trade,
WORLD REPORTER, Jan. 10, 2000.
72 In addition to the United States, the European Union, Australia,
Belarus, Bulgaria, Canada, Czech Republic, Hungary, Japan, New Zealand,
Norway, Poland, Slovak Republic, Switzerland, and the Russian Federation
currently have GSP programs.
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competitive advantage in the markets of industrial countries. It is,
however, a unilateral grant of tariff concessions; developing countries
are not required to extend reciprocal tariff reductions.73
Title V of the Trade Act of 1974, 74 as amended, authorizes the
President of the United States to provide duty-free treatment for any
eligible product from any beneficiary developing country (BDC) and
establishes criteria for designating eligible countries and products.
Among other points, the President must take into account the level of
economic development of the country, its commitment to a liberal
trade policy, and the extent to which it provides adequate protection of
intellectual property rights. This last point was of great importance in
justifying the use of the GSP as a bargaining weapon against
Argentina. The Trade Act also authorizes the President to withdraw
GSP treatment for any article or any country. Beneficiary GSP
countries are persuaded to change objectionable policies or practices
by the mere threat of losing these benefits.
During the years before Argentina finally started to issue
pharmaceutical patents on Oct. 24, 2000, Special 301 and the GSP
were the United States' main weapons of persuasion.
C. WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT PROCEEDINGS
Disputes regarding compliance with the TRIPs agreement were
to be settled under the procedures in the Dispute Settlement
Understanding (DSU).75 The United States could have presented this
dispute over intellectual property rights in Argentina before the World
Trade Organization much earlier than it actually did. Instead, it chose
not to do this for many years, utilizing unilateral devices such as the
73 WILLIAM H. COOPER, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, CRS
REPORT FOR CONGRESS 97-389: GENERALIZED SYSTEM OF PREFERENCES (2001)
("The preferential and unilateral nature of GSP is a departure from the principles
that have guided post-World War II multilateral tariff reductions under the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The GATT provides that trade must be
conducted on a nondiscriminatory, or most-favored-nation (MFN), basis. Generally,
members of the World Trade Organization (the organization that replaced the
GATT Secretariat in 1995 and currently administers world trading rules) must
extend any tariff concessions to all trading partners. Tariff reductions under the
GATT have also been based on reciprocity: tariff concessions from each member
country are reciprocated by concessions from others. Since 1971, however, a GATT
waiver has allowed the industrial countries to extend preferential tariff treatment for
developing countries."), available at
http://www.cnie.org/nle/crsreports/economics/econ-60.cfm (last visited Jan. 1,
2002).
74 19 U.S.C. § 2101 etseq (1994).
75 TRIPs, supra note 12, pt. V, art. 64, 33 I.L.M at 106.
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Special 301 and GSP as it did in cases involving other countries.76 The
USTR did finally initiate a "request for consultation" under the WTO
Dispute Settlement Understanding in May 1999 to address concerns in
this area. A year later, Ambassador Barshefsky, the USTR,
"supplemented" the original consultation request to address additional
concerns that had arisen as a result of Argentina's failure to implement
obligations that came due on January 1, 2000."
VII. SPECIAL 301, GSP, AND WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT
PROCEEDINGS: USE AND EFFECTS
This section will examine the interaction between the United
States' trade policy tools and the results of their pressure on
Argentina's pharmaceutical patent regime. In order to achieve this, a
"time line" format shall be utilized. As was stated earlier, the Special
301 and GSP were the two foreign policy "tools" utilized by the
United States to coerce Argentina into adopting U.S. standards of
intellectual property protection. On some occasions, they were directly
applied (or withdrawn in the case of the GSP); however, at other
times, they were equally as effective as threats. Beginning in May
1999, consultations were also initiated under the DSU.
The beginning point of the analysis is the late 1980's. In 1988
the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association (PMA) filed a petition
under Section 301 as a consequence of Argentina's refusal to accept
patents on pharmaceutical products.78 A year later, in September of
76 See Pechman, supra note 64 at 197 (commenting on the case of
Argentina's neighbor, Brazil). The USTR initiated a Special 301 action against
Brazil in 1987 due to lack of pharmaceutical patent protection. Id. Brazil did not
negotiate and as a result the United States imposed 100% tariffs on $39 million worth
of Brazilian exports. Id. Brazil consequently complained that this was illegal under
GATT. Id. Once Brazil agreed to work on legislation that included pharmaceutical
patents, the US withdrew the sanctions and Brazil dropped its GATT complaint. Id.
However Brazil's promises were not kept and the United States designated it as a
PFC in April 1993. Id.
77 Letter from Rita D. Hayes, Ambassador Permanent Mission of the
United States to the World Trade Organization, to H.E. Mr. Juan Carlos Sdmchez
Amau, Ambassador Permanent Mission of Argentina (Geneva) (May 30, 2000) (on
file with the Yale J.L. Tech.) ('This request for consultations supplements and does
not replace the United States' earlier request for consultations made in WTO
Document WT/DS171/1, notified May 6, 1999."), available at
http: / /www.cptech. org/ip/health/c/argentina/consultationmay302OOO.html (last
visited Jan. 1, 2002).
78 CONSUMER PROJECT ON TECHNOLOGY, BILATERAL TRADE
DISPUTES INVOLVING THE UNITED STATES, OVER INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND
HEALTH CARE ("On August 10, 1988 the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association
(PMA) filed a petition [citing] Argentina's denial of product patent protection for
pharmaceutical products and discriminatory product registration procedures... On
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1989, one of the first "threats" of utilizing trade policy devices was
issued to pressure Argentina into protecting intellectual property.
During this month, the USTR declared that it would apply sanctions
totaling $80 million to steel pipes imported from Argentina as a
consequence of the economic losses suffered by US companies because
of the lack of patent protection.7 9 However, the measure was never
executed in exchange for a promise made by Domingo F. Cavallo,
who was the Argentine Minister of Foreign Relations at the time, to
enact a new patent law. ° Cavallo's commitment was that in a two-
year period a bill allowing, among other things, the patentability of
pharmaceutical products would be sent to Congress. As a result, the
United States Government temporarily suspended inquiry
proceedings, initiated under Section 301. The promise was kept, but
not until three and a half years later. The Executive presented the bill
for the Patent Law to the Senate on May 6, 1993.1 This bill was truly
revolutionary in Argentina where pharmaceutical patents were
concerned, and it signified a shift in policies behind the proposed
legislation.12 Its stated objective was to "make the Argentine patent law
comply with the standards and levels agreed upon internationally." 3
This demonstrates that Argentina was committed (at least through the
September 25 1988, USTR initiated an investigation regarding PMA's allegations.
Following consultations, the petition was withdrawn on September 23, 1989 because
of Argentina's willingness to modify its pharmaceutical registration procedures and
to address constructively the issue of patent protection for pharmaceutical
products."), available at http:/ /www.cptech.org/ip/health/country/allcountries.html
(last visited Feb. 20, 2003).
79 Sebastidm Curet, La Relacion EEUU-Argentina-Brasil Analizada en
la cuesti6n de patentes farmaceuticas 23 (1999) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
the Yale J.L. & Tech.).
80 See Buscaglia & Long, supra note 16 ("Argentina was subject to a
Section 301 investigation of pharmaceutical patent protection in 1988, which was
withdrawn in 1989 on the basis of expected legislative reform.").
81 Diario de Asuntos Entrados, Afto IX Nro. 9 (Viernes
07/05/1993) Senado de la Naci6n, Secretaria Parlamentaria, Direcci6n de
Publicaciones, 115. (on file with the Yale J.L. & Tech.).
82 In the 1993 bill, the Executive initially makes important
considerations regarding how Argentina had been internationally marginalized for
not having tackled this reform in legislation earlier on. It goes on to state that the
standards of intellectual property protection for the next century must be set and
suggests the following questions to keep in mind in order to make a just analysis of
the convenience of granting pharmaceutical product patents in Argentina:
1. How many medicines have been invented in our country?
2. Under the old law (No. 111) how many patent holders for technology are
Argentine?
3. How much does Argentina spend on health related research and
development?
4. How much royalty payments are made for the use of technology applied in
the medical field?
See Diario de Asuntos Entrados, supra note 81 at 116.
83 See Diario de Asuntos Entrados, supra note 81 at 116.
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Executive) to embracing the international standards of intellectual
property protection almost two years before the TRIPs Agreement was
finalized. The bill granted immediate patent protection for
pharmaceutical products, 4 and it did not contain a "local production
clause." In other words, it did not mandate that any patented product
be produced locally (as long as the final price of the medication was
not the result of illegal, anticompetitive acts). It did contemplate
situations in which compulsory licenses could be granted.
Argentine Law No. 24.481,5 which the Congress passed almost
two years later (before the modifications introduced by Law No.
24.572), contained some important sections that were greatly opposed
by the United States. 6 Sixteen of these sections were vetoed by the
Executive through Presidential Decree 548/95 two weeks after the bill
was passed. 7 Presidential Decree 548/95 constituted one of the first
signs of how the United States' threat of trade sanctions were
beginning to have an effect on pharmaceutical patent protection in
Argentina. Through this decree, the Argentine Executive rejected
some articles of the law that were in direct opposition to the policies
and standards maintained by the United States. 8 One such article was
Article 42, which mandated that the patent holder was obligated to
manufacture the product locally and was prohibited from importing
it.$9 This article (which contradicted Article 27.1 of TRIPs) constituted
a key point defended by local laboratories. The Presidential Decree's
importance in this analysis cannot be underestimated; it goes as far as
stating that pharmaceutical patent rights should be granted
immediately. It thus opposes the transition periods adopted through
Articles 104 and 105 of the original text of Law 24.481 by stating that
"these.. .would only delay investments in research and development,
and in consequence industry growth as well as general economic
activity.., at the same time they [the delays] would continue to
segregate [the Argentine Republic] from the vast majority of the
84 Id.
85 Sanctioned by the Argentine Congress on March 30, 1995.
86 The US government placed Argentina on the 1995 Watch List for
reasons including inadequate protection of test data submitted for marketing
approval. CONSUMER PROJECT ON TECHNOLOGY, supra note 78.
87 Decree No. 548/95, B. 0. Apr. 21, 1995.
88 The Menem Administration vetoed the portions of the law that did
not comply with the TRIPs agreement and replaced them with an interim decree by
the end of April 1995. CONSUMER PROJECT ON TECHNOLOGY, supra note 78. These
actions would have provided strong patent protection in Argentina by Jan. 1, 1996,
and TRIPs-consistent compulsory licensing measures. Id. However, in late May
1995, the Argentine Senate voted to override portions of Menem's veto, re-instituting
an eight year transition period for pharmaceutical patent protection and onerous
compulsory licensing provisions. Id.
89 Law No. 24.481, art. 42 (original text). See also Decree No. 548/95,
B.O. Apr. 21, 1995.
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countries of the international community that recognize and respect
intellectual property rights for pharmaceutical products. "9 0
As a result of the veto, the United States did not impose
commercial sanctions on Argentina (although it did suspend peanut
imports).91 Argentine Law No. 24.481 went back to Congress and was
passed on May 23, 1995 with only a few minor modifications. The law
still contained many articles that did not conform to the United States'
desires. This meant that the Executive had much work ahead in trying
to modify the articles. The main conflicting articles regarding
pharmaceutical products were Articles 104 and 105, which stated that
patent protection would be available as of January 1, 2003.92 Although
this was within the time frame allowed by the TRIPs Agreement, it did
not satisfy the United States. This led to a very peculiar decision by the
Executive: it delayed publishing the law in the Boletin OficiaL93 It did
this in the hopes that the United States Government would not impose
any sanctions on the country.94 Meanwhile, the Menem administration
tried to convince members of the Congress to introduce an amendment
to the law. It succeeded during the month of July 1995, when the
Senate voted in favor of the changes in the law, but the Ctmara de
Diputados (lower House) would not be as easily swayed.
95
At this point, the United States utilized the GSP to exert
pressure on the Argentine Congress in the treatment of the
modifications to the law. On August 16, 1995 the U.S. Government
turned down Argentina's request to incorporate 25 new products into
the GSP.96 In September 1995 Law No. 24.572 was passed and
introduced the new date for patent protection on pharmaceuticals:
October 24, 2000. 97 However, the complex legislative process that had
90 Id.
91 Curet, supra note 79.
92 Law No. 24.481, art. 104, 105, B.O. Sept. 20, 1995.
93 Enardece a opositores el 'minicongreso' de Menem, AMBITO FINANCIERO,
June 15, 1995.
94 Article 2 of the Argentine Civil Code states that "The laws are not
obligatory until after their publication and from the day they determine. If no time is
designated, they shall be obligatory after 8 days following their official publication."
CbD. Civ. art. 2. This was the reason for the very unusual procedure adopted by the
Executive: by delaying publication, the law was not obligatory although it had been
passed by Congress.
95 Curet, supra note 79, at 24.
96 Id.
97 Law No. 24.572, B.O. Oct. 23, 1995. Law No. 24.481 was finally
published in the Boletin Oficial on September 20, 1995, almost 4 months after it was
passed. Law No. 24.481, B.O. Sept. 20, 1995.
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taken place, added to the different laws and decrees on the subject, had
created an extremely imprecise regulation of pharmaceutical patents. 98
In 1996 the United States announced that it would continue to
exert pressure on countries such as Argentina "to accelerate
implementation of this [TRIPs] Agreement. " 99
In early 1997 the dispute over pharmaceutical patents became
very tense. The United States based its complaints on the insufficient
level of protection provided by the Argentine Patent Law and the
Confidentiality of Information Law which, as explained, were not well
received by the Clinton Administration.1"' This situation ultimately led
to President Clinton's announcement of sanctions in the form of a 50%
reduction in benefits granted to Argentina under the GSP. 10 1 The
measure was executed on April 15, 1997.102 This constituted a victory
for PhRMA, who had been trying to persuade the U.S. Government to
adopt stronger methods to increase the level of intellectual property
protection in Argentina. 103 However, Argentina's minister of Foreign
Relations Guido DiTella, stated that the patent law conformed to
98 See "Dupont de Nemours, E.I. Company c. Estado Nacional
Ministerio de Economia," CNFed. Civ. y Com. [1996-A] L.L. 321 ("[a] normative
panorama that is messy, imprecise and not coherent."); "Sandoz Ltd. C. Instituto
Nacional de la Propiedad Industrial," CNFed. Civ. y Com. [1998-D] L.L. 556
(Delgado, J.) ("[t]he legislative and implementation disorder that dominated the
scene in this field."); Jorge Otamendi, Un Golpe Al TRIPs, [1999-C] L.L. 120 ("In the
chaotic and shameful sanction of the patent law 24.481...").
99 Press Release, Office of the USTR, supra note 65.
100 See Jorge Elias, Patentes: Impulsan en el Congreso la Ley del Talion, LA
NAcION LINE, Jan. 9, 1997 (USTR Charlene Barshefsky expressed that she was very
worried that Argentina had not taken adequate measures to improve the protection
of patents, particularly of pharmaceutical products).
101 Press Release, Office of the USTR, USTR-Designate Announces
GSP Sanctions Against Argentina for Continuing IPR Problems (Jan. 15, 1997) (on
file with the Yale J.L & Tech.) ("United States Trade Representative designate
Charlene Barshevsky announced today the Clinton Administration's decision to
withdraw 50% of trade benefits granted to Argentina under the U.S. Generalized
System of Preferences (GSP). Duty free importation of products from Argentina will
be withdrawn with respect to approximately $260 million of trade. This decision was
the result of the "out of cycle" review under the U.S. Government's "Special 301"
Program, designed to advance the protection of U.S. intellectual property rights
around the world. '). But see, Luis Cortina, Las Sanciones Comerciales Golpean Duro a
las PYME, LA NAcIbN, Jan. 16, 1997 (stating that the amount was closer to $515
million).
102 Martin Boerr, Trabas de EE. UU. Para Productos Argentinos, LA
NAcIbN LINE, Apr. 16, 1997 (President Clinton announced to the United States
Congress that he had determined that, under its laws, Argentina failed to provide
adequate and effective measures to foreigners to defend, exercise, and affirm their
exclusive rights to intellectual property.).
103 See generally Jorge Elias, Las Sanciones Comerciales Golpean Duro a las
PYME, LA NAcIbN LINE (Jan. 16, 1997) (pointing out that the amount of the
penalty imposed on Argentine exports was estimated to total $50 million).
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TRIPs standards and that the "Argentine Government would not
modify legislation it was completely satisfied with." 104
The 50% reduction in benefits under the GSP towards
Argentina has a "double reading." It could be argued that it
demonstrated the close relationship of the Menem administration to
the United States (so close that only a 50% reduction would be applied
instead of the 100% available). After all, it was under the Menem
administration that every effort was made to send to the Argentine
Congress the levels of pharmaceutical patent protection within the
TRIPs Agreement plus time frames pushed by the United States. Since
the implementation decree of the Confidentiality of Information Law
was pending, the Argentine Executive could still "improve"
legislation to better comply with standards proposed by the US. 10 5 On
the other hand, it also meant that an additional 50% of the GSP
benefits remained available for more pressure in the future.
Argentina, like the United States, chose not to present the case
to the WTO, although some legislators did toy with the idea for a brief
time. The reasons for this were most likely twofold. In the first place it
would have been difficult to make a case before the WTO that the
withdrawal from Argentina of 50% of the benefits under the GSP
constituted a "commercial sanction" since it could be viewed as a
unilateral concession made by the United States. 106 Secondly, a case
before the WTO over the GSP would have had additional complexity
since no similar case had ever been presented to the panel. All this
having been said, the Argentine Government lost a chance to present
the issue before the WTO under the DSU. For all practical
considerations, the withdrawal of benefits under GSP is the equivalent
of a commercial sanction and was even categorized in this way by the
United States Government through the USTR. 107
Enacting this reduction, the United States ended $260 million
in trade preferences for 113 Argentine imports.10 The range of
products included items from chemicals to certain metals to a variety
of manufactured products and agricultural items. 109 Added to this there
104 Boerr, supra note 102.
105 It should be noted however, that under Argentine Law the
implementation decree cannot modify "the spirit of the law." CONST. ARG. art. 99,
cl. 2.
106 See Citing Patent Piracy, US Ends Trade Benefits, LAGNIAPPE LETTER,
Apr. 18, 1997.
107 Press Release, Office of the USTR, supra note 101.
108 Citing Patent Piracy, US Ends Trade Benefits, supra note 106.
109 See Mercedes Tira-Andre, US Priority Watch Listing for RP
Recommended, BUSINESSWORLD, Apr. 30, 1997, at 1.
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was also a perceived delay by the Clinton Administration in accepting
Argentine exports of beef and peanuts."'l
During 1998, the United States Senate became involved when
the Chairman of its Foreign Relations Committee, Jesse Helms, asked
USTR Charlene Barshefsky to impede imports from Argentina on
products such as grapefruits, lemons and oranges as a result of the lack
of protection for pharmaceutical products.Ill This came just a few days
before the United States Department of Agriculture's final
authorization for such imports, which had been under an extensive
review for the previous five years in order to verify that they met the
requirements necessary for introduction into the U.S. market. Senator
Helms based his request on the fact that the United States Government
had been pressuring the Argentine Government for over a decade to
convince it to enact and reinforce its patent laws without achieving this
objective. Secondly, the members of CILFA (the powerful Argentine
pharmaceutical trade union) were still acting in the same way they had
for years, copying patented products. Finally, the GSP reductions
failed (in the Senator's opinion) to influence Argentina's conduct.112
Senator Helms' request was successful to some extent. After
this episode, Argentine citric imports were in effect suspended for 120
days by rescheduling the public hearings113 on the USDA's "proposed
rules" '114 to allow the importation of grapefruit, lemons, and oranges from
Argentina. In this way, the issue of sanctions related to pharmaceutical
patents in Argentina was placed on the agenda once again.
In May of 1999 the United States Government opted for an
approach that Argentina, particularly through its Legislative branch,
had been requesting. This was to take the Argentine case to the WTO
in the form of a "request for consultations" as is mandated under the
TRIPs Agreement, which at this point had been in force for over four
years. 115 Some of the reasons behind the United States' action can be
summarized as follows:
110 See Argentina won't Alter Patent Law Despite U.S. Trade Measure, Dow
Jones News Service, Apr. 15, 1997.
111 Jorge Elias, Los EE. UU. Piden Trabas Para Citricos Argentinos, LA
NAcIbN LINE, Oct. 10, 1998. Senator Helms, in his note to the USTR expressed
that he was amazed that the administration was offering a new market area to an
Argentine industry. In his view, this action could suggest that the administration was
not serious in resolving the intellectual property issue. Id.
112 Id.
113 Press Release, USDA, USDA Reschedules Public Meeting on
Importation of Argentine Citrus (Dec. 3, 1998) (on file with the Yale J.L & Tech.).
114 63 Fed. Reg. 43124-43125 (Aug. 12, 1998).
115 Dispute Settlement Update, Office of the USTR (last modified Jan.
30, 2003) ("On May 6, 1999, the United States filed a consultation request
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1. The absence in Argentina of either patent protection for
pharmaceutical products or an effective system for providing exclusive
marketing rights in such products.
2. Argentina's failure to protect confidential test data
submitted to government regulatory authorities for pharmaceuticals.
3. Argentina not having met the obligations established under
the TRIPs Agreement to make internal legislation comply with such
agreement.
4. Argentina's control organisms, such as the INPI, not
functioning properly.
5. Argentina's failure to provide provisional measures, such as
preliminary injunctions, to prevent infringements of patent rights.
The news was not well received in Argentina. A bill was
immediately presented by legislators in which the "transition period"
for the issuance of pharmaceutical patents was pushed back to 2005
(the maximum allowed under the TRIPs Agreement).116 The bill also
contained a "local production" clause117 (as is mandated in Brazil) as
well as certain additional requirements before exclusive marketing
rights for pharmaceuticals would be granted. There were, however,
challenging Argentina's failure to provide a system of exclusive marketing rights for
pharmaceutical products, and to ensure that changes in its laws and regulations
during its transition period do not result in a lesser degree of consistency with the
provisions of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights ('TRIPS Agreement'). Consultations were held on June 15, 1999, and again
on July 27, 1999. On May 30, 2000, the United States expanded its claims in this
dispute to include new concerns that have arisen as a result of Argentina's failure to
fully implement its remaining TRIPS obligations that came due on January 1, 2000.
These concerns include Argentina's failure to protect confidential test data submitted
to government regulatory authorities for pharmaceuticals and agricultural chemicals;
its denial of certain exclusive rights for patents; its failure to provide such provisional
measures as preliminary injunctions to prevent infringements of patent rights; and its
exclusion of certain subject matter from patentability. Consultations continued until
April 16, 2002, when the two sides agreed to settle eight of the ten issues in the
dispute. Argentina and the United States notified a settlement of these issues to the
DSB on May 31, 2002. Consultations continue on the unresolved issues."), at
http://www.ustr.gov/enforcement/update.html (last visited Mar. 15, 2003) (on file
with the Yale J.L. & Tech.).
116 See Menem Afirmo que Vetaria una nueva Ley de Patentes, LA NACION
LINE, June 17,1999. The Bill was presented by Diputados Emilio Martinez Garbino
(PJ), Juan Pablo Baylac Rafael Flores (Alianza) and Humberto Roggero (PJ). Id.
However, President Menem stated that he would veto such a law. Id.
117 See Amenaza de EE. UU. PorLa Ley de Patentes, LA NAcION LINE, Feb.
18, 2000. The clause was incorporated by Diputado Rafael Flores. Id.
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some positive reactions among local politicians who thought that the
controversy over pharmaceutical patents should have been presented
to the WTO long before. The Argentine International Economic
Relations Secretary, Jorge Campbell, thought that the decision had a
positive side to it because it recognized the dispute settlement
mechanisms of the WTO. 11' These considerations come as no surprise,
mainly because the WTO DSB is viewed by smaller countries as a
forum in which they can compete on the same level with the most
powerful ones.
An important victory for the United States came in February
2000 when the De la R-ia Administration119 changed the principal
officers of the INPI. The three removed directors had been named
during Menem's last days as President in 1999 and were always
suspected of favoring local pharmaceutical companies because of their
ties to Diputado Humberto Roggero. Coincidently, the measure was
announced during a visit to Buenos Aires by Deputy USTR Richard
Fisher. Mr. Fisher had pressured for the removal of the INPI Directors
during his trip 120 and warned of further sanctions if the Argentine
Patent Law was modified to lessen US backed levels of protection for
pharmaceuticals. 121
A few months later, in April 2000, yet another victory for the
Clinton Administration came as the Argentine Executive and
legislators agreed to "freeze" all talks of changing the articles of the
Patent Law that referred to pharmaceuticals. 122 The road was cleared
for granting pharmaceutical patents by October 24, 2000.
The following table summarizes the interactions between
Argentina and the United States over a 14 year period in the
Pharmaceutical Patents Case:
118 See Jorge Rosales, Embate de EE. UU. por las Patentes, LA NAcION
LINE, Apr. 29, 1999. In this sense, Diputado Humberto Roggero stated that "I am
very pleased that they [the USA] understand that the WTO and arbitral tribunals
exist so that in this way the threats, pressures and sanctions will stop given that we
are convinced that our laws on intellectual property do not violate international
laws." Id. (translation by author).
119 Fernando De la R-ia, President of Argentina 1999 2001.
120 See Cambios en el INPI, LA NAcIbN LINE, Feb. 18, 2000. (quoting
Richard Fisher, Deputy USTR, as stating that the INPI has been a problem and that
he hoped that the new government exerts real leadership) (translation by author).
121 See Amenaza de EE. UU. Por La Ley de Patentes, supra note 117.
122 See Laura Serra, Patentes: Congelan la Discusion Legislativa, LA
NAcION LINE, Apr. 9, 2000.
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Event in Argentina
Patent Law No. 111 did not
recognize pharmaceutical product
patents.
Domingo F. Cavallo, the
Argentine Minister of Foreign
Relations, promised to enact a new
patent law (Publicly announced at the
Argentine Advertisers Chamber,
October 1989).
The bill for the new Patent
Law was presented to the Senate by
the Argentine Executive on May 7,
1993.
In April 1995, the Argentine
Congress passed a patent law (original
text of Law No. 24.481) that included
an eight year transition period for
pharmaceutical patent protection.
Sixteen sections were vetoed
by the Executive through Presidential
Decree 548/95, two weeks after the
law was passed.
Event in the United
States
On August 10, 1988, the
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers
Association (PMA) filed a petition
citing Argentina's denial of product
patent protection for pharmaceutical
products and discriminatory product
registration procedures. On September
25, 1988, the USTR initiated an
investigation into PMA's allegations.
Following consultations, the
petition was withdrawn on September
23, 1989 because of Argentina's
willingness to modify its
pharmaceutical registration procedures
and to address constructively the issue
of patent protection for pharmaceutical
products.
The bill was received well by
the United States, mainly because it
granted immediate patent protection to
pharmaceuticals; it did not mandate
that any patented product be produced
locally, but did contemplate situations
in which compulsory licenses could be
granted.
The US government placed
Argentina on the 1995 Watch List for
reasons including inadequate
protection of test data submitted for
marketing approval.
As a result of the veto, the
United States did not impose
commercial sanctions on Argentina.
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The law went back to
Congress and was approved on May
23, 1995 with only a few minor
modifications. The law still had a
number of articles that did not
conform to the requirements of the
United States, and the Executive
would have much work ahead in
trying to modify them. The main
articles in conflict were Articles 104
and 105, which stated that patent
protection would be available as of
January 1, 2003.
In September 1995, Law No.
24.572 was passed, introducing
changes to the date for patent
protection for pharmaceuticals:
October 24, 2000.
In early 1997, the situation
over pharmaceutical patents became
very tense. The United States based its
complaints on the insufficient level of
protection of the Argentine Patent
Law and the Confidentiality of
Information Law passed in December
1996.
Argentina did not modify any
of the questioned laws.
On August 16, 1995 the U.S.
Government turned down Argentina's
request to incorporate 25 new products
into the GSP system.
The United States announced,
in 1996, that it would continue to
pressure countries such as Argentina to
raise the levels of intellectual property
protection. 123
President Clinton announced
the reduction of 50% of the benefits
granted to Argentina under the GSP
on January 15, 1997. The measure was
executed on April 15, 1997.
Argentine citric imports were
suspended for 120 days, in October of
1998, and the issue of sanctions related
to pharmaceutical patents in Argentina
was again placed on the agenda. In
May of 1999, the United States
brought the Argentine case to the
WTO.
123 See, Inti Linkletter Knapp, The Software Piracy Battle in Latin America:
Should the United States Pursue its Aggressive Bilateral Trade Policy Despite the Multilateral
TRIPs Enforcement Framework?, 21 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 173, 205 (2000) ("The
United States indicated that it will continue to engage in an aggressive section 301
policy because it can pressure developing nations to enact even greater intellectual
property protection than required by TRIPs.").
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February 2000: the De la Ria
Administration changes the principal
authorities of the INPI.
April 2000: the Argentine
Executive and legislators agreed to
"freeze" all talks of changing the
articles (to lessen protection standards)
of the Patent Law that referred to
pharmaceuticals. However, Argentina
did not modify any of the questioned
laws to comply with US complaints.
Argentina started issuing
pharmaceutical patents on October 24,
2000.
The USTR released its
"Special 301" Report 2000 (1999
period). In this evaluation, Argentina
was classified as a "priority watch list"
country and a second WTO dispute
settlement case (expanding its claims
against Argentina) was announced.
The USTR released its
"Special 301" Report 2001 (2000
period). In this evaluation, the USTR
recognized that Argentina began to
issue pharmaceutical patents for the
first time and reported progress toward
resolution of the case against
Argentina. It also stated Argentina had
fulfilled some, but not all, of its long-
standing commitments to the United
States on intellectual property.
VIII. THE CORE OF THE CONTROVERSY
The inconsistency of United States policy is a central problem
when trying to get developing countries to make massive legislative
changes to their pharmaceutical patent protection standards. On the
one hand, the Clinton Administration heavily promoted the standards
contained in the TRIPs Agreement. But once Argentina enacted
TRIPs standards internally, the United States began to pressure for
earlier implementation of the standards 124 and higher standards, such
as pipeline protection, using unilateral trade sanctions. As the USTR
stated, "U.S. law determines that a foreign country may be deemed to
deny adequate and effective protection of IPR's [intellectual property
rights] notwithstanding compliance of the said country with the
specific obligations stipulated by the TRIPs Agreement., 125 The point
here is obvious: if the United States wants countries to comply with
standards mutually agreed upon, it should not at the same time bypass
the agreed upon mechanisms such as the DSU by unilaterally
pressuring for higher standards through mechanisms such as Special
124 See Press Release, Office of the USTR, supra note 65. See also Press
Release, Office of the USTR, supra note 23.
125 CORREA, supra note 5, at 110.
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301 or GSP withdrawal.126 President Clinton's address to Congress
revealed the inconsistency which led to the described controversy: "If
members of the DSU do not comply with their obligations at the end
of the dispute settlement process, trade action under section 301 of the
Trade Act of 1974 will be legitimized..." 127 In other words, sanctions
imposed by the U.S. before the DSU process was initiated and
completed were not legitimate. The crux of the issue is that, after
TRIPs, retaliation can only be authorized by a ruling of a panel under
the Dispute Settlement Understanding.12  Section 301 actions,
however, did not cease despite the enactment of TRIPs. 129 The USTR,
moreover, admitted that GSP withdrawal constituted a "sanction"
against Argentina. 13 0
The United States waited too long in bringing its complaints
about Argentine patent protection to the WTO under the DSU. When
it finally did so, in May 1999, it had arguably already violated the
letter of the TRIPs Agreement131 by reducing benefits under the GSP in
1997132 and suspending Argentine citric imports in 1998. The following
section assesses the negative consequences such coercive mechanisms,
after TRIPs, can have on a developing country.
126 See Knapp, supra note 123 at 176 ("The United States should no
longer combat software copyright piracy using unilateral trade threats to force
bilateral agreements; instead, the United States should use WTO enforcement
mechanisms created by TRIPs.").
127 Memorandum for the United States Trade Representative, 58 Fed
Reg. 67263, 67292 (Dec. 15 1993).
128 See Pechman, supra note 64, at 201.
129 See also Knapp, supra note 123, at 179 ("In its legislation adopting
TRIPs, the U.S. House of Representatives stated that 'nothing in this Act shall be
construed . . . to limit any authority conferred under a law of the United States,
including Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, unless specifically provided for in
this Act."').
130 See Press Release, Office of the USTR, supra note 101. See also,
Wendy S. Vicente, A Questionable Victory For Coerced Argentine Pharmaceutical Patent
Legislation, 19 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 1101, 1108 (1998) ("The United States
responded with trade sanctions on $260 million of Argentina's exports... ").
131 See Pechman, supra note 64 at 202 ("The DSU requires Members to
invoke the dispute settlement mechanism without making unilateral determinations
regarding violations of any of the WTO Agreements.").
132 See Press Release, Office of the USTR, USTR Announces List of
Argentine Products to Lose GSP Benefits as a Result of "Out-Of-Cycle Review"
(Apr. 15, 1997) (on file with the Yale J.L. & Tech.). Some of the Argentine products
that lost duty-free treatment included: sea bass, milk protein concentrates, garlic,
gold compounds, butanone, certain drugs, paints and varnishes based on synthetic
polymers, essential oils of grapefruit, certain perfume mistures, shampoos, personal
deodorants and antiperspirants, prepared glues, photographic plates, certain radial
tires, fur clothing accessories, writing paper, tempered safety glass, some engine
parts, parts of frames and mountings for spectacles, and wooden furniture. Id.
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IX. ASSESSING THE NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES
OF COERCIVE MECHANISMS AFTER TRIPS
The use of unilateral sanctions by the U.S. has numerous
negative consequences, detailed below.133
A. NEGATIVE IMPRESSION OF THE U.S.
Under the TRIPs Agreement, retaliation is permitted after
utilizing the DSU procedures only in the same trade sector.134 The
unilateral measures taken by the United States, however, not only may
have violated the letter of TRIPs by not following the DSU, but also
exceeded the "scope" of permitted retaliation. This is evidenced in
GSP withdrawal as well as in the commercial sanction of Argentine
grapefruits, lemons, and oranges, which are not even remotely related
to the pharmaceutical industry. This increased the negative perception
that Argentines had of United States policy.135 A disdain of U.S.
"economic imperialism" was reflected in the statements of the
president of the local pharmaceutical association.136
B. RISK OF PROVOKING RETALIATION
The level of pressure that the United States exerted over the
Argentine government in the case of pharmaceutical patents came very
close to backfiring. An example of this can be drawn from the events
that took place after President Clinton's decision to reduce 50% of the
benefits granted to Argentina under the GSP on January 15, 1997.
First of all, the United States' unilateral action ignited a great deal of
debate in Argentina. The GSP is a unilateral "preference" by the
United States, and some might argue that, in this sense, it can legally
be taken away in the same manner it was given. It is clear, however,
that in the Argentine case the restriction of a percentage of GSP
preferences was actually used as a commercial sanction against the
country since it was directly linked by the Clinton Administration to
133 See also ERNEST H. PREEG, FEELING GOOD OR DOING GOOD WITH
SANCTIONS: UNILATERAL ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AND THE U.S. NATIONAL
INTEREST (1999) ("The use of unilateral economic sanctions for foreign policy
objectives has a number of inherent, or at least highly likely, downsides that need to
be taken into account when considering the use of such sanctions. These downsides
do not mean that the imposition of sanctions cannot achieve a given purpose, but
rather that they need to be factored into the overall basis for decision...").
134 Pechman, supra note 64, at 203.
135 See also Knapp, supra note 123, at 209 (2000) ("Latin American
countries have been enraged by perceived U.S. capitalist bullies...").
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the standards of protection in local intellectual property laws.137 Many
arguments and anti-American sentiments, particularly in the Ctmara
de Diputados, could have been avoided if the controversy had been
presented before the WTO at this time. Since it was not, the general
perception was that the Argentine laws conformed to TRIPs standards.
This, in turn, led to unexpected consequences. For example, Diputado
Humberto Roggero (P.J.-C6rdoba), President of the Industry
Commission and one of the legislators most critical of the United
States' decision, stated that it constituted "an interference in internal
affairs of Argentina." Roggero also suggested raising internal taxes on
cola beverages as an act of retaliation towards the United States'
decision.13 He even presented a bill that would have excluded from
public bids any company whose capital had its origin in any country or
countries that had adopted unilateral commercial sanctions against
Argentina.139
Other bills presented during this time included:
1. A bill introducing a modification of the patent law,
pushing back the availability for pharmaceutical patents to
2005.140
2. A bill mandating that the Executive apply commercial
sanctions to those countries "which violating WTO laws apply
sanctions that affect our commerce.,
141
3. A bill containing a "local production" clause, putting
the issue once again in the eye of the storm. 142
These examples demonstrate that members of foreign
legislatures do not differentiate between negative consequences
resulting from Special 301 pressure and those resulting from GSP
withdrawal.
137 See Press Release, Office of the USTR, supra note 101. See also
Judith H. Bello & Alan F. Holmer, "Special 301 ". Its Requirements, Implementation, and
Significance, 13 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 259, 262 (1989) ("If the acts, practices, or
policies continue, the USTR is authorized, but is not required, to retaliate by
increasing duties or imposing other restrictions on imports.").
138 See Luis Cortina, Las Sanciones Comerciales Golpean Duro a las PYME,
LA NAcION LINE, Jan. 16, 1997. The proposal was to raise taxes on cola beverages
from 4% to 24%. Id.
139 See Patentes. Rechazan una Sanci6n, LA NAcION LINE, Apr. 15, 1997.
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C. WEAKENING EXCLUSIVE MARKETING RIGHTS
With all the U.S. sanctions and threats of sanctions, EMR's
were not granted except in the two cases described. This shows that it
would have been better for the United States to take the issue before
the WTO under the DSU sooner than it did. By the time
"consultations" under the DSU began, only 16 months were left until
Argentina would begin issuing patents on pharmaceuticals, thus
reducing the EMR's importance. Once the corresponding patent is
granted (or if the patent application is rejected), such rights are
terminated.
D. EFFECT ON U.S. IMPORTERS OF ARGENTINE PRODUCTS
The potential for negative effects on U.S. importers arising
from measures such as Argentine product withdraw from the GSP
should also be considered. In other words, "[w]hen the United States
imposes trade sanctions against a Special 301 target country, those
industries in the United States that rely on importing targeted products
and consumers who wish to purchase targeted products are adversely
affected." '143 These negative effects are even more evident when the
amount and diversity of the merchandise are taken into account. For
example, when the U.S. announced trade sanctions against Brazil for
its lax intellectual property protection, many U.S. companies
expressed opposition.144 In any event, this is another component that
should be considered when analyzing the "local" consequences of
certain mechanisms employed to improve intellectual property
standards overseas.
E. EFFECT ON THE FUNCTIONING OF DEMOCRATIC
INSTITUTIONS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
U.S. actions to pressure Argentina to increase protection of
pharmaceutical patents at times interfered with the functioning of the
Argentine government. The delay of the Argentine Executive in
publishing Law No. 24.481 is one example of U.S. interference with
Argentine democratic institutions. The declarations of the Deputy
USTR in Buenos Aires regarding the removal of the INPI Directors
also border on interference into an internal matter of another country
and jeopardize the proper functioning and designation of authorities of
143 Harrison, supra note 1, at 483.
144 Id. at 484 ("[c]orporate officials from General Electric, Xerox, Dow
Chemical, Rohm & Haas Co., Ford Motors, Black & Decker and others [who]
testified that proposed tariffs would increase costs from U.S. companies and
consumers and would affect U.S. interests more than Brazilian interests.").
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a governmental agency. These public statements do not seem to
accelerate the granting of patents. On the contrary, they tend to spark
reactions from sectors that view this as going too far and intruding in
the functioning of a local agency.
This issue should be considered with great caution by future
administrations if they pursue enhanced IP protection in developing
countries that do not have a long tradition of uninterrupted democratic
governments. The main point to make here is that the United States
will have to decide what it considers more valuable: the interests of
associations such as PhRMA, or the promotion of well functioning
democratic institutions in developing countries. In a country with a
strong Executive (compared to the other branches), maneuvers that
obstruct laws not "in the interests" of the United States can only
damage democratic principles.145 Sidestepping a weak legislature can
only exacerbate the problems that such a country's young democracy
already has. Of course, it would be illogical to fault the United States
for political and institutional problems in another country.
Nevertheless, political realities should not be ignored when pressure is
exerted on a foreign Executive in order to improve US interests.
F. THE "LEGAL MAZE" OF PATENT PROTECTION
IN ARGENTINA DURING THE MID-1990'S.
The United States' pressure for earlier and higher standards
than those required under TRIPs led to a series of laws, decrees, and
implementations that went back and forth between the Argentine
Executive and its Legislature. The end result was a puzzle that only
specialized attorneys could understand. Practitioners were not even
sure of the dates on which patents would be allowed under existing
law.146 Needless to say, this did not contribute to stronger IP rights in
the pharmaceutical field.
145 See Wendy S. Vicente, A Questionable Victory For Coerced Argentine
Pharmaceutical Patent Legislation, 19 U. PA. J. INT'L. ECON. L 1101, 1116 (1998) ("The
United States treads on thin democratic ice when it encourages Menem to disrespect
the Argentine Congress and force stronger intellectual property laws upon
Argentina.").
146 See Ernesto O'Farrell, Tres Fallos Polmicos, [1999-A] L.L. 26 ("As a
conclusion, it should be noted that it will still take a long time to sort out the mess
derived from the confusing legislative process.").
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G. EFFECTS ON FUTURE EFFORTS OF
HARMONIZATION IN OTHER FIELDS
The conclusions that developing countries could draw from the
actions taken by the United States after the implementation of TRIPs
may reach other fields as well. For example, in the future the U.S.
might push for adequate levels of "privacy" protection on the Internet
through a multilateral agreement. The disregard for established
procedures and mechanisms described above can only undermine such
future efforts to harmonize other areas of law. How will the United
States argue that it intends to be bound by international agreements
after the example it set in the case of Argentine pharmaceutical
patents?
H. SHOULD THE U.S. LET PHRMA INFLUENCE ITS
FOREIGN IP PROTECTION POLICIES?
The Argentine case demonstrated just how much of an
influence PhRMA had on the United States' policies in this field. It
may seem surprising that "a U.S. Trade Representative official
admitted that it decided to enforce the patent law-related sanctions
based entirely on data and information supplied by PhRMA." 147 The
U.S. should not base its decisions on applying trade sanctions based
solely on information supplied by an interested party. Furthermore, in
the case of Argentina, a U.S. governmental agency (the Patent and
Trademark Office), denied members of ALIFAR (the Latin American
Pharmaceutical Association) the chance to participate in a conference
dealing with intellectual property.14 Actions such as these have been
directly linked to the pressures exerted on the U.S. Government by this
powerful association. 49
X. PROPOSED ALTERNATIVE MECHANISMS
This section proposes a few alternative mechanisms to the DSU
to help further IP protection in developing countries. Such
mechanisms were either not applied soon enough or were never
pursued at all in the case under analysis.
147 Vicente, supra note 145, at 1108.
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A. TRIPS ARTICLE 67
Article 67 of the Agreement imposes some "cooperation
duties" on its developed country Members towards developing and
least-developed country Members. These duties can include assistance
in the preparation of laws and regulations on the protection and
enforcement of intellectual property rights, training of personnel and
support in the establishment of offices and agencies relevant to such
matters.15°  This provision encourages and facilitates the
implementation of the standards under TRIPs.
During the time that the described reforms were taking place,
Argentina needed assistance in many areas related to IP protection.
Failures in the computer systems, thousands of applications for patents
without approval (24,801 as of June 1999), and irregularities in its
treasury and in the designation of its employees (some of which lacked
the necessary experience) were the main flaws pointed out in relation
to the management of the INPI by diplomatic sources.151
This TRIPs instrument, amazingly, was not utilized by the
United States during the five years in which the dispute over
pharmaceutical patents was at its peak (1995-2000).152 Article 67 could
have provided an additional mechanism to achieve supplemental goals
in this field by allowing the United States to collaborate with local
agencies such as the INPI. This agency is crucially important but
unfortunately lacks the necessary budget to meet its obligations. This
TRIPs device is an additional "peaceful weapon" that could have been
utilized in this case; training or support of personnel could have helped
sway public opinion that in turn could have pressured members of the
Argentine Congress to reach a solution to the conflict.
B. PROMOTE LOCAL RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
THROUGH FOREIGN AID TO TARGETED COUNTRIES
Another alternative mechanism is for the United States to
"[p]rovide foreign aid earmarked for Latin American research and
development. Although such an investment would result in potential
competition for U.S. companies, it would also increase Latin
American self-interest in enforcing effective intellectual property
150 TRIPs, supra note 12, pt. VI, art. 67, 33 I.L.M at 108.
151 See ElINPI, OtraPesadaHerencia, LA NAcIbN LINE, Nov. 19, 1999.
152 Interview with Engineer Luis Noguds, supra note 42.
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protection." '153 Drug companies could also participate in encouraging
foreign research.154
C. JUDICIAL REFORM
This issue can be summarized as follows: what is the sense of
promoting strong patent legislation overseas if it can never be
effectively enforced due to the inefficiencies of a judicial system?155 The
case of Argentina clearly demonstrates this point. Reports such as
those of the World Bank on the Argentine judiciary reflect just how
critical the problems in the judiciary are.156 It has been stated that "a
right without a remedy is but an expensive illusion." '57 In other words,
what would be the practical effect of obtaining a patent if effective
enforcement is not available? Another important issue that should be
addressed is the need to create specialized intellectual property courts
in Argentina, analogous to the Federal Circuit in the United States,
which could help upgrade intellectual property protection. Some Latin
American countries such as Peru, Chile and Panama already have
these specialized judicial structures in place. 5 '
The United States Government could contribute funds for
judicial sector reform. PhRMA could also fund some of the specific
reforms that might be needed in the intellectual property field such as
the creation of specialized patent courts. Such reforms could work to
their benefit, although the involvement of PhRMA in the judiciary
raises the concern of industry interference with the courts' impartiality.
Having a well trained and funded judiciary might prove very helpful to
PhRMA members in obtaining objective results in patent infringement
cases.
Finally, judicial reform not only improves intellectual property
protection but also encourages and sustains other elements of
economic development. 59
153 See Knapp, supra note 123, at 210.
154 See Vicente, supra note 145, at 1137.
155 See Knapp, supra note 123, at 200 ("The judiciary in these countries
often needs training in new matters of high-tech intellectual property. In addition,
some Latin American judicial systems lack the same adequate remedies or
enforcement procedures that the U.S. judicial system employs.").
156 See generally LEGAL VICE PRESIDENCY, THE WORLD BANK,
ARGENTINA LEGAL AND JUDICIAL SECTOR ASSESSMENT (2001) (assessing the state
of the judicial branch in Argentina).
157 See Robert M. Sherwood, Intellectual Property for Latin America: How
Soon Will it Work, 4 SPG NAFTA: L. & Bus. REV. AM. 77, 88 (1998).
158 Id. at 89.
159 Id. at 90.
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D. EDUCATING SOCIETY ON THE IMPORTANCE OF
PHARMACEUTICAL PATENT RIGHTS
Finally, it should be noted that swift section 301 results might
not guarantee that intellectual property is protected.16 ° Societies tend to
respect property rights that they recognize. Such is the case with "real
property." However, intellectual property rights present an additional
challenge because in many cases they deal with high-tech issues that
might not seem as "tangible." Associations such as PhRMA might
benefit from following the example of some U.S. software companies
that "have worked to increase awareness in both the public and private
sectors about the benefits of intellectual property protection to a
domestic economy.""16  Educational programs to promote "IP
awareness" could be put in place if the proper funding were made
available. Education, rather than coercion has been suggested 62 but
not applied in the pharmaceutical field. This would be especially
helpful in cases of countries such as Argentina, where intellectual
property protection is not highly regarded among the general
population.163
160 See Knapp, supra note 123, at 205 ("When the United States opts for
swift section 301 results over slower WTO dispute settlement procedures and lower
TRIPs protection requirements, the United States is not laying the foundation for
true cultural acceptance of intellectual property rights. Rather, U.S. trade aggression
increases the Latin American perception that the true beneficiaries of intellectual
property rights are U.S. capitalists.").
161 Id. at 208.
162 See id. at 210.
163 See Robert M. Sherwood, Intellectual Property Systems and Investment
Stimulation: The Rating of Systems in 18 Developing Countries, 37 IDEA 261, 290 (1997)
("While a tradition of esteem for literary accomplishment has given copyright
protection some public backing [in Argentina], an assertive campaign against patent
protection for pharmaceuticals has produced a predominantly negative impression of
intellectual property in much of the population.").
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XI. CONCLUSION
This analysis describes the radical transformations in
pharmaceutical intellectual property protection in Argentina during
the 1990s. Most importantly, it highlights the effect of the use by the
United States of unilateral trade weapons to pressure Argentina to
adopt certain standards in this field.
The enforcement or threatened enforcement of Section 301 of
the US Trade Act, along with GSP restrictions, have proven to be
controversial tools in protecting US interests abroad as is demonstrated
by the Argentine case. Some positive results were achieved for United
States' interests but the United States created at the same time negative
implications by pressuring for more protection in a shorter time than is
mandated under TRIPs: in other words, requiring "TRIPs-Plus"
standards. 164 "[R]etaliatory trade policies and other efforts to coerce
the premature adoption of intellectual property protection can damage
developing economies and run counter to U.S. goals. This is especially
true where the intellectual property in question is pharmaceutical
patents." 165
The following tables summarize the results of the United States'
utilization of its trade policy mechanisms to influence in Argentine
pharmaceutical intellectual property protection:
What the U.S. was able to achieve through its trade policy
1. A patent law covering pharmaceutical products was
sent to the Argentine Congress and passed in 1995.
164 Knapp, supra note 123, at 205 ("The United States is required under
TRIPs to submit intellectual property complaints to the Dispute Settlement Body of
the WTO and abide by the WTO ruling. However, the United States indicated that it
will continue to engage in an aggressive section 301 policy because it can pressure
developing countries to enact even greater intellectual property protection than
required by TRIPs."). See also Chakravarthi Raghaven, United States Pushes for Greater
IPR Privileges in FTAA, THIRD WORLD NETWORK, Apr. 3, 2001, ("The U.S. intent
[referring to the Free Trade for Americas Agreement (FTAA)] also represents a case
of TRIPs-plus because it calls for exclusive rights in handling data presented for
registering pharmaceutical ... products, which would generate a monopoly situation
even without the existence of a patent."), at
http://www.twnside.org.sg/title/pushes.htm (last visited March 14, 2003) (on file
with the Yale J.L & Tech.).
165 Stefan Kirchanski, Protection of U.S. Patent Rights in Developing
Countries: U.S. Efforts to Enforce Pharmaceutical Patents in Thailand, 16 LoY. L.A. INT'L
& COMp. L.J. 569, 607 (1994).
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2. The "transition period" for granting pharmaceutical
patents was brought down to 5 years from the
original 10 years under TRIPs and the 8 years that
were contemplated in the original Argentine patent
law.
3. The patent law's implementation decree included the
"exclusive marketing rights" that were not
contemplated in the text of the law.
4. The "local production clause" was not included in
the patent law and no modification containing it was
approved by the Argentine Congress. Brazil's law
has such a clause.
5. The INPI's directors were replaced in 2000.
6. Although one aspect of compulsory licenses is still a
conflicting issue, up to the present date none have
been granted for pharmaceutical products.
What the U.S. was not able to achieve
through its trade policy
1. Make Argentina grant "pipeline" or retroactive
protection for pharmaceuticals (as Brazil's law does).
Note, however, that "pipeline" protection is not
required under TRIPs. 166
2. Full recognition of EMR's.
3. "Linkage" between ANMAT and the INPI
(although this was a concern expressed for by
PhRMA more than by the US Government).
4. The Argentine Law No. 24.766 on confidentiality of
information, has still not been implemented.
166 See Holmer, supra note 21. President Memen may have promised
the U.S. that Argentina would establish pipeline protection. Id. "The new legislation
falls far short of the commitment made by President Menem in 1989 to enact a
patent law in Argentina that would afford product protection for pharmaceuticals
immediately, provide protection to products in the pipeline, and severely limit the
compulsory licensing of patents." Id.
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Request for consultations under the
DSU presented by the U.S.16 7
1. Article 42 of the Argentine patent law: "Other Uses without
the authorization of the Patent Holder" also known as
Compulsory Licenses. However, since the INPI directors
were removed this does not constitute the same threat as it
did in the past for US interests.
2. Exclusive Marketing Rights issue.
3. Law on confidentiality issue / protection of undisclosed test
or other data.168
4. Failure to provide prompt and effective provisional
measures, such as preliminary injunctions, for purposes of
preventing infringements of patent rights from occurring.
5. Improper limitation of judiciary authority to shift the
burden of proof in civil proceedings involving the
infringements of process patent rights.
In order to make a fair judgment of the effectiveness of the U.S.
trade policy tools utilized in the Argentine case, several points must be
kept in mind. First, it should be remembered where Argentina stood
on pharmaceutical patent protection ten years ago: no patents were
available for pharmaceutical products. Second, the TRIPs Agreement
came to life in the mid 1990's setting certain minimum standards. The
United States was able to expedite the application of these standards
by pressuring Argentina to begin working on a new patent law several
years before TRIPs was concluded. After this, the trade policy tools
described helped to set a 5 year transition period instead of a 10 year
167 Certain Measures on the Protection of Patents and Test Data,
Request for Consultations by the United States, WTO Doc 00-2220 (June 6 2000);
Argentina - Patent Protection for Pharmaceuticals and Test Data Protection for
Agricultural Chemicals - Request for Consultations by the United States, WTO Doc
99-1954 (May 10, 1999).
168 See generally, Robert S. Tancer & Shoshana B. Tancer, MERCOSUR
and the Pharmaceutical Industry- Waiting for a Common Patent Regime, LATIN AM. L. &
Bus. REP., Apr. 30, 1997, (explaining the U.S. drug industry believed that this piece
of legislation "[w]as a thinly disguised attempt to invalidate the pharmaceutical
patent protection which had just recently been approved. This new law developed
the argument that patent protected products available in international markets were
no longer 'novel' and therefore were ineligible for patent protection in
Argentina. This opened the door for imitations which could be protected under
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period.169 Even though this was not as good as the result achieved in
Brazil,17° five years is a respectable time especially considering the
amount of money that was involved in the Argentine "pirate"
pharmaceutical industry.171 Additionally, the directors of the INPI,
who were suspected of being a threat to intellectual property rights,
were replaced as a direct result of pressure exerted by the United States
government. Thus the power of these tools should not be
underestimated; they were, at the very least, taken into consideration
when the decision to remove the INPI directors was taken during the
early months of the De la R-ia Administration.
The United States, however, did not obtain 100% of its initial
objectives and had to deal with additional and unforeseen
complications. First of all, the United States did not win pipeline
protection of pharmaceuticals. The Argentine Congress maintained a
position that is hard to refute: the TRIPs Agreement does not require it
and in consequence pipeline protection constitutes a nonnegotiable
item. Second, the delay by the United States to initiate DSU
consultations and failure to present the case to the WTO made the
Argentine people believe that the local law did comply in full with
what was mandated under TRIPs. This, in turn led to anti-American
sentiment that was taken advantage of by members of Congress to
introduce bills that could have further damaged United States' interests
(such as extending the transition periods to take advantage of the full
length established under TRIPs or taxing American products such as
cola beverages). Third, the facts demonstrate that in some cases,
pressures by the United States tend to complicate rather than to
facilitate the process of legislative change.172
Additionally, it should be noted that all the events described
took place during the radical Argentine economic transformations of
the 1990's.173 This was a decade in which diplomatic and commercial
169 See also Buscaglia & Long, supra note 16 ("TRIPs and the expected
trade gains have tipped the balance in favor of introducing a stronger intellectual
property framework that is more compatible with U.S. laws; Yet . . . U.S. foreign
policy pressure is necessary to keep the momentum of legal reform going.").
170 See Pechman supra note 64, at 200 ("The Brazil pharmaceuticals
case is an early indication of the efficacy of such a plan [using Special 301 to
persuade developing countries to comply with TRIPs standards as quickly as
possible]. Due to continued threats of retaliation under Special 301, Brazil ultimately
agreed to immediate implementation of TRIPs standards without regard to the
transition period it was allowed as a developing country.").
171 See also Buscaglia & Long, supra note 16 (observing that the pirate
pharmaceutical industry in Argentina was estimated to be worth $4.6 billion).
172 CORREA, supra note 5, at 210.
173 For a description of another area of radical transformations in
Argentina during the 1990's, see Hernan L. Bentolila, Privatization & Deregulation of
the Argentine Telephone Service 1990-2000, 6 NAFTA: L. & Bus. REV. AM. 557 (2000).
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relations between both countries were at the closest level they had ever
been. Argentina was "[o]ne of its [United States] closest allies in South
America..." 174 Throughout this process the United States was able to
count on the full political support of the Argentine Executive, which
utilized all of its constitutional powers as well as its influence over the
Argentine Congress. When analyzing the Argentine case as a guide for
future strategies for extending pharmaceutical IP protection in other
countries, the above political consideration should be kept in mind.
The United States might also employ TRIPs Article 67 in future cases
and collaborate with local agencies such as the INPI.
Few countries in the world underwent such radical
transformations in pharmaceutical intellectual property protection as
Argentina did during the 1990's. The Argentine foreign policy shifted
towards embracing United States' standards of competition and an
open market economy. At the same time issues such as pharmaceutical
intellectual property protection were successfully placed by the United
States at the center of the negotiation table. Unilateral pressure is still
an important part of United States trade policy even after the DSU
under WTO. 175 The United States continues to apply unilateral trade
pressure by keeping Argentina on the USTR's "priority watch list,"
which may lead to additional trade sanctions. It has been said that
even after TRIPs and its DSU, "merely carrying a big stick is, in many
cases, as effective a means to having one's way as actually using the
stick., 176 In the case of Argentina, both threat and actual use of the
stick were employed by the United States. However, although in this
case a respectable outcome for the United States' interests was
achieved, the risks and potential costs of employing a "big stick"
policy should at the very least provoke additional consideration in
similar cases over remaining "transitional period" years in developing
and least developed countries regarding the protection of
pharmaceutical intellectual property rights.
177
174 US May Hike Tariffi on Argentine Imports; L.A. TIMES, Jan. 16, 1997,
at D3.
175 See Graciela Guadalupe, Patentes: EE. UU. Sancion6 a la Argentina, LA
NAcIbN LINE, Jan. 15, 1997.
176 Choudhury, supra note 71.
177 It should be noted that "the WTO Council responsible for
intellectual property, on June 27,2002, approved a decision extending until 2016 the
transition period during which least-developed countries (LDCs) do not have to
provide patent protection for pharmaceuticals." Press Release, World Trade
Organization, Council approves LDC decision with additional waiver (June 28,
2002), available at http: / /www.wto.org/english/news-e/pres02-e/pr3O le.htm (last
visited Mar. 14, 2003) (on file with the Yale J.L. & Tech.). A waiver also exempts
least developed countries from having to give exclusive marketing rights. Id.
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